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ABSTRACT 
 
Russia’s course of action over the past 12 years caused global concern. This thesis outlines 
the precise moment that Russia altered its foreign policy and the underlying reasons for that 
change. In doing so, the approached to international relations and international law are 
considered and analyzed. 
The bachelor thesis further outlines the main Russian positions on foreign policy and derives 
a hypothesis that is further proven through the consideration of two case studies. 
Key words: Russia, International relations, International law, Realism, Ukraine, Georgia 
SUMMARY 
This paper identifies the Russian perspective on international law and international relations 
since 2007. The research is structured in four parts: Firstly, the thesis provides an analysis of 
Russia’s characteristics that render it a realist actor in order to hold validity to subsequent 
arguments that are based on the notions. The importance of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 
Munich Security Conference is established and the fact that the speech marks the change of 
Russia’s foreign policy is outlined. Secondly, an overview into the international law revolving 
around the jus ad bellum and the principle of self-determination as well as Russia’s approach 
to those is provided. Thirdly, Russia’s state practice and communication is analyzed and 
finally deduced into paradigms that outline the main findings: 
1. Russia sees itself as a non-aggressor.  
2. Russia identifies a deterioration of the status of international law by the West and accuses 
the West of hypocrisy.  
3. Russia sees the West as driven by expansionism and geopolitical intentions. 
Fourthly, these notions are further solidified in two case-studies, the Russo-Georgian war and 
the Ukraine-crisis. These are analyzed and at the same time, serve the purpose to further 
consolidating the hypothesis. Lastly, the findings are discussed and analyzed in an overall 
conclusion. This finally leads to the conclusion that the hypothesis, “The course of action of 
the Russian Federation since 2007 is a result of perceived aggressions and double-standards of 
the west” -is proven and that Russia is an actor that solely focuses its actions on state interest 
as opposed to international norms.  
4 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West anticipated the transition of the dissimilar 
and at the time -adjusting Russia. It was a common understanding that naturally, after the 
infamously proclaimed “end of history”1 by Francis Fukuyama, the Russian state would adopt  
western liberal views and adapt its comprehension of moral governance, nationally and 
internationally. Evidently, this conception was false. Instead, it appears Russia, even though 
the state became more liberal and capitalistic, had moved further away from western values.  
Russia has continually attempted to position itself back into the world order as a 
“superpower” in order to counter the Wests’ influence. Its recent state practice as well as its 
several aggressions within the last 12 years, which, since the Ukraine crisis, eventually 
became a matter of global concern, can only lead us to conclude that the study of Russia’s 
approach towards International Law, International Relations and the inherent difference in 
interpretation thereof must be worth studying. This research takes the western view into 
account and thus additionally creates a comparative perspective. 
The time period for the research from 2007 to 2019 has been selected. The time period has 
been chosen for the following reason:  
In 2007, the year of the infamous speech made by Putin at the Munich Security Conference, 
marks the precise moment that Russia announced the alteration of its foreign policy. The 
speech serves as a starting point for this thesis, its relevant aspects are analysed and will serve 
a continuous explanatory purpose when considering the two subjects of this Thesis. The 
alteration firstly comes into action in 2008 in the Russo-Georgian war. A reassertion can be 
observed in 2014 in the Ukraine crisis.  
 
The research question of this thesis is: “How does Russia approach international relations and 
the closely connected international law, specifically jus ad bellum and the principle of self-
determination since 2007.” 
The hypothesis of the thesis is “The course of action of the Russian Federation since 2007 is a 
result of perceived aggressions and double-standards of the west”.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Fukuyama, F. (2006). The end of history and the last man. Simon and Schuster. 
5 
The research question this thesis aims to answer is how Russia approaches international 
relations and international law since its foreign policy alteration in 2007. The specific goal is 
to establish the overall underlying motivation in Russia’s track record of intervention and its 
challenges towards the norms of both international law and the international order. This thesis 
takes a qualitative deductive approach to analyse the conduct of the state and to prove the 
hypothesis. 
This thesis is divided into four interrelated sections. The first section examines insight into 
Russian foreign policy by analysing it through the lens of international relations theory. The 
second section presents the Russian perspective on International Law and specifically the area 
of jus ad bellum as the law regulating war is mostly relevant for the example cases as well as 
the matter of this thesis. Thirdly, the extraction of the Russian state practice and 
communication will be deduced into paradigms. In order to do this, firstly the official 
communication revolving around the actions of the Russian state will be analysed and broken 
down into overarching theories that can be derived. Subsequently, stemming from the derived 
theories, the hypothesis will be deduced. The fourth section is a critical analysis of the cases, 
taking into account the previous sections as well as problems that might arise. The course of 
action of the last 12 years in both fields of international law and international relations will be 
analysed by three case studies. The combined aspects will demonstrate an overall approach to 
the global order and a pattern will emerge. Lastly, an overall conclusion backed by the 
findings of the case studies will be given, the hypothesis elaborated and a potential future 
outlook will be provided. 
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1. THE THEORY OF REALISM AND THE MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE IN 
2007 
 
In order to explain the view of states on any matter, the methodology of analysis has to be 
established. Thus for the purpose of this thesis, and specifically for the case studies, a 
theoretical framework for the analysis has to be given and explained. The theory of 
International Relations gives great insight not only in how to identify a state’s behavioural 
conduct but also once established, it lets one conclude and understand why certain states with 
respective categories of international relations act in a certain way.  
There are several aspects that let one conclude that the Russian Federation has a strong realist 
foreign policy. Aside from the apparent consensus by numerous academic scholars identifying 
Russia as a Realist actor,
2
 this conclusion can be reached by analysing the theory itself and 
balancing it with the state’s actions and official strategies. As an image of politics, Realism is 
concerned with power and power politics among states, but many realists have also been 
concerned with values and norms and the role they play in ordering international politics.
3
 
Below is an overview of the four main paradigms of the Realist theory as described by 
Kauppi and Viotti
4
; their connection to Russia will be elaborated. 
 
1.1 Russia’s Realism 
 
Firstly, the world is an anarchical place in which states are the only actors of importance. As 
Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs states: “[Putin] believes the 
world today is absolutely unpredictable, ungovernable, risky and dangerous.”5  
Furthermore, international organisations are merely a tool for states to act through. This 
would, for example, render the United Nations as an institution to achieve political 
aspirations. The Directorate-General for external policies of the EU highlights Russian 
practice in the UN Security Council: “[E]vents in Libya have persuaded decision-makers in 
                                                 
2
 Maintra, S. (2014). Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: Crimean Case. CLAWS Journal”, summer.  
3
 Carr, E. H., Cox, M., & Cox, M. (1946). The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the 
study of international relations (p. 101). London: Macmillan. 
4
 Kauppi, M. V., & Viotti, P. R. (2009). International relations theory. Pearson Longman. 
5
 M. M., & F. L. (2012, November). The logic of Russian foreign policy [Web log post]. Retrieved May 2, 2019, 
from https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/event/Talking-point-the-logic-of-Russian-foreign-policy-Marie-Mendras-
and-Fyodor-Lukyanov-join-oDRussia-ed# 
 
7 
both Moscow and Beijing to reject any similar proposal concerning another Middle Eastern 
state.”6  
Secondly, the state is one entity and acts as a whole on the international stage according to 
one set of policies. Political differences within the state are ultimately solved authoritatively 
in order to present a unified and common position. The elite in Russia has established a 
domestic system that allows for its foreign policy to shape public opinion, granting it 
increasing leeway in shaping public opinion and ultimately following its desired path of 
action:  
Often, the Kremlin has found it sufficient to play this card [anti-americanism] in the 
media, increasing the access to television of a stable of anti-American commentators
7
 
This phenomenon will be further explored in the chapter “domestic aspect”. 
 
Thirdly, the state acts rationally, according to its political objectives. When doing so, it 
outweighs the available options and pursues the one that, to the respective individual state, 
appears to be the most efficient one. Evidently, this paradigm is intertwined with the fact that 
Russia’s main concern remains security. This leaves one to conclude that recent actions, 
including the change of attitude towards the West marked by the 2007 Munich Security 
Conference, are to be understood as rational actions that served Russia’s political objectives. 
Specifically the targeted and timed interventions in near-abroad states such as Georgia and 
Ukraine which were progressing towards western alliances, depict Russia’s desire to secure its 
sphere of influence and ultimately its security. The backlash cannot have been unexpected by 
Russian decision makers, yet consideration of risks and benefits evidently led to a decision to 
intervene. 
 
Lastly, a realist state’s highest priority is security. The state revolves around actual and 
potential conflicts, the use of force and it values its territorial integrity tremendously. A realist 
state thus sees economic and social issues as lower priority issues of the state. Putin stated:  
[W]e see that there are many challenges and risks in today’s world, including in the 
immediate vicinity of our borders. So a powerful army equipped with modern arms is 
a guarantee of Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, a guarantee of peace and 
calm for millions of our citizens.
8
 
                                                 
6
 Ferdinand, P. (2013). The positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the light of recent 
crises. Briefing Paper. Belgium: European Union. 
7
 Greene, S. A. (n.d.). Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in Russia: Why Moscow’s Shift to Confrontation with 
Washington is Structural [Web log post]. Retrieved April 21, 2019, from 
https://moscowonthames.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/20130311-sgreene-ponars.pdf 
8
 Russian government, Presidential Executive Office. (2015, June 25). Reception in honour of graduates of 
military academies[Press release]. Retrieved April 22, 2019, from 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49763 
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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been on an on-going quest to regain its 
global image of a world power or even superpower.
9
 Its recent actions can only confirm this. 
In international relations a super power status is achieved when a state has the power to exert 
power and influence in the world.
10
 The main method for Russia to do so is through military 
means. Russia’s military with a defence budget of $44.6 billion, is ranked the second-most 
powerful, after the US.
11
 Russia’s main concern, as also evident from the Munich speech, is 
the countering of the power of the US in order to avoid unipolarity on the world stage. Russia 
sees unipolarity as unacceptable and as enhancing conflicts.
12
 
The major models of foreign policy in realism are sphere of influence, the balance of power 
and great power management.
13
 This thesis argues that Russia’s foreign policy mostly 
resembles the sphere of influence theory. Russia seeks predominantly to exert influence onto 
its near abroad and by doing so not only achieve power but also counter the power of the 
West and thus ultimately manage the power in its region. This conclusively renders the further 
advancement of western institutions such as the European Union but mainly the military 
alliance NATO towards the East, a highly controversial matter for the Kremlin. It was so in 
history and remains so today. 
 In 1999, within a matter of days after the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became 
members of NATO, the alliance started to bomb Serbia, a Slavic Orthodox country – just like 
Russia. While this event as well as the intervention in Bosnia in 1995 had morally good 
western intentions, the fact that the biggest military alliance proceeded to carry out legally 
unsanctioned attacks in Russia’s near-abroad as well as the further expansion into the former 
Warsaw Pact members which would from now on naturally be western oriented in their 
policies, decisively shaped the relationship into one of adversaries.
14
 The following has to be 
considered: during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was approximately 1900km away from the 
nearest NATO member, now with the Baltic States being a full member it is about 100km 
away. For a realist state this is inherently alarming.
15
  
                                                 
9
 Kozhemiakin, A. V., & Kanet, R. E. (Eds.). (2016). The foreign policy of the Russian federation (p. 183). 
Springer. 
10
 Miller, L. (2005). China an emerging superpower. Stanford Journal of International Relations, 6(1). 
11
 C. W. (2018, June 18). These are the 25 most powerful militaries in the world. Business Insider. Retrieved 
from https://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-ranked-2018-2?r=UK 
12
 Russian government, Presidential Executive Office. (2007, February 10). Speech and the Following 
Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy[Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 
13
 Mowle, T. S. (2003). Worldviews in foreign policy: Realism, liberalism, and external conflict. Political 
Psychology, 24(3), 561-592. 
14
 B. S. (2018, February 12). Russia’s Clash With the West Is About Geography, Not Ideology. Foreign Policy. 
Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/12/russias-clash-with-the-west-is-about-geography-not-
ideology/ 
15
 "Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR." BBC News, April 25, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm. 
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1.2 From the Munich Security Conference to the Ukraine Crisis 
 
The infamous speech made by Vladimir Putin at the Munich security conference is a turning 
point in Russia’s policy and was thus chosen as decisive for the time frame of this thesis. 
While Putin has been in power in Russia acting as either Prime Minister or President since 
1999, he only attended the Munich Security Conference once, underpinning the importance of 
the message he gave. The president announced a drastic challenge towards the western-led 
world order and denounced US practice of security policy.
16
 Putin starts his speech by 
referring to the end of the cold war, continuing with his criticism of the proposed 
unipolarity.
17
 Subsequently he criticises  the United States unilateral military actions:  
Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. 
Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of 
tension.
18
 
Furthermore, Putin stressed the issue of the NATO eastern expansion:  
I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the 
modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the 
contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And 
we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what 
happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact?
19
 
Both these quotes can be seen as especially representative of the whole speech and ultimately 
as Russia’s position on Foreign Policy since. The speech is of increased relevance since the 
assertions can be seen retrospectively, as announcing the countering of NATO’s influence in 
Georgia and Ukraine through Russian intervention. Assertions similar to those given in the 
speech, constantly appear throughout  the official communication of the state ever since, 
which signifies the importance and representative value for Russia’s foreign policy. 
Putin, starts  his speech recollecting the time since the Cold War and then, from his 
perspective, defines the consequent recent missteps of the West, as well the NATO 
expansions and aspirations by declaring them tools for geopolitical gain as opposed to 
security in Europe. In doing this he  essentially describes the resentment of western action and 
position in the past and declares the adaption of Russia to it. Russia announced its change of 
Foreign policy. 
                                                 
16
 Supra note 12. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
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Russia’s invasion of Georgia, only one year after the speech brought actions to these words. 
Russia followed up on its conclusion with the west and successfully so. It proved to the world 
that the NATO expansions can be countered and that the United States of America cannot 
prevent it from doing so. From the perspective of Russia it was ideal to intervene and depict 
Russia’s sphere of influence.  
Yet Russia did not remain on the course of the Munich Security Conference. Instead it can be 
seen as a snowball-effect predating the increasing assertiveness of  Russian foreign policy. 
The success of the Russo-Georgian War created the confidence and the Euromaidan unrests, 
highlighting the western-orientation in Ukraine, eventually created the need to move Russian 
troops into Ukraine.  
1.3 Russia’s domestic aspect 
 
In order to analyse the status and handling of International Law as well as international 
relations of one state, one has to consider the domestic aspect. It can be seen that the domestic 
legal situation of a state usually reflects it international nature and behaviour. This is further 
described by Lauri Mälksoo, Professor of International Law at the University of Tartu, in his 
book “Russian Approaches to International Law”:  
[I]t is necessary to take a thorough look inside the state and the society itself, 
particularly in the world of its predominant ideas that shape the country’s 
understanding of international law. In Russia’s case, the country’s historically unique 
on and off and periodically hostile relationship with Europe and nowadays the West, 
its historically established tendency of authoritarian government, relative weakness of 
the rule of law inside the country, and the utmost desire to preserve the territorial 
integrity of Russia as the world’s largest territorial state have decisively shaped post-
Soviet Russia’s approaches to international law.20 
Decision-makers in general are greatly influenced by the political and social state of their 
respective countries. Although, in the case of Russia this remains limited to the elite only, as 
such discourses are kept amongst key decision-makers and top ranking officials.
21
 The 
significance of the society of a state and its philosophy and thus ultimately where these come 
from, when considering its international law, becomes apparent and underlines the need to 
consider the elements that shape the Russian nation and civil discourse. Russia has a system 
that provides for its foreign policy to shape domestic public opinion. Specifically, anti-
Americanism is used as a tool for creating a “common enemy” and to shape public opinion in 
                                                 
20 Mälksoo, L. (2015). Russian approaches to international law. Oxford University Press, USA.  
21
 Ibid.  
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a way that it stands behind its current government.
22
 Furthermore, the Russian government 
has immense control over the state media and is able to shape even private outlets in a way 
that favours the position of the state and allows for influence of the public in an immense 
way. 
23
 The government uses the media to keep and achieve a government-friendly domestic 
opinion, broadcast state policies to foreign audiences and finally to influence foreign 
viewers.
24
 This combined with a low English-proficiency
25
 allows for the state to shape public 
opinion in its favour on any matter it wishes, ultimately granting the government massive 
leeway in decision-making as repercussions from the public are simply of no concern.
26
 A 
poll after the Ukraine crisis shows that almost nine out of ten Russians supported the 
President Vladimir Putin.
27
 This shows, that the Russian elite has immense power to influence 
and ultimately to independently shape the foreign policy aspirations of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Zakem, V., Saunders, P., Hashimova, U., & Frier, P. K. (2017). Mapping Russian Media Network: Media's 
Role in Russian Foreign Policy and Decision-Making (No. DRM-2017-U-015367-1Rev). CNA ANALYSIS 
AND SOLUTIONS ARLINGTON VA ARLINGTON United States. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Supra note 22. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Rankin, and George Arnett. "Vladimir Putin's Approval Rating at Record Levels." 
The Guardian. July 23, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2015/jul/23/vladimir-putins-
approval-rating-at-record-levels. 
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2. RUSSIA’S PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The term “International Law” should logically, have a unified meaning. Nevertheless, it is 
proposed and understood by many scholars, that in fact International Law comes from the 
European tradition, yet simultaneously it is perceived as universal in the West.
28
 It often 
appears that the West has developed its own liberal approach towards international law to the 
distress of other conservative-leaning states, amongst them Russia, which see international 
law through a rather realist lens. An obvious display of the polarization of approaches towards 
the interpretation of international law can be observed and will be further defined in this 
chapter. 
2.1 Divide in interpretation 
In April of 2018, the Syrian state was accused of using chemical gas for an attack in 
Damascus. While the involvement of the Syrian state in the attack was denied by Syria and 
Russia, which has many military bases in the country, the US claimed to have reliable 
information regarding their involvement. Ultimately, it came to the US, France and the UK 
cooperating in attacking chemical weapons facilities.
29
 The relevant factor in the event was, 
that the three western countries did not consult the United Nations Security Council, which 
would effectively violate the sovereignty of Syria as prescribed in Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter (hereinafter: the Charter): “[…]All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state[…]”30. Such intervention, under International Law and 
specifically the Charter, is explicitly only intended after a consultation of the UN Security 
Council or in cases of self-defence, as prescribed in Chapter VII of the Charter. While the 
three states felt vindicated in their actions by the western states’ overall acquiescence, 
Moscow naturally condemned the attack. It has to be mentioned that Russia, during the then-
six years of Syria’s war, vetoed 8 resolutions concerning President Assad’s government, 
effectively hinting to anyone that another attempt for a resolution would have been vetoed 
with certainty. Nevertheless, this raises the question of the standing of the UN system for 
western states, when those that cannot get their will, would merely ignore the laws to which 
                                                 
28
 Koskenniemi, M. (2005). International law in Europe: between tradition and renewal. European Journal of 
International Law, 16(1), 113-124. 
29
 Julian Borger. "Syria: US, UK and France Launch Strikes in Response to Chemical Attack." The Guardian, 
April 14, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/syria-air-strikes-us-uk-and-france-launch-
attack-on-assad-regime. 
30
 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  
13 
they bound themselves. This accurately represents Russia’s view on the matter. As Putin put it 
in 2014: 
In absence of legal and political instruments, arms are once again becoming the focal 
point of the global agenda; they are used wherever and however, without any UN 
Security Council sanctions. And if the Security Council refuses to produce such 
decisions, then it is immediately declared to be an outdated and ineffective 
instrument.
31
 
It becomes a matter of principle. As history shows, Russia is certainly not innocent when it 
comes to military interventions without the consultation of the Security Council. In fact, it has 
been outlined that in these situations, the US and Russia have a similar history of putting state 
interest above international law
32
 and the matter becomes one of justifying the immense 
necessity of intervention. Although, states in similar cases often refer to the doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect which basically indicates that international action can be taken if a 
population is under instant threat. While this would allow for a legal way to circumvent the 
above-mentioned charter’s protection of sovereignty of states, it does not allow for disregard 
of the Security Council i.e. Responsibility to Protect still requires the Security Council’s 
consent.
33
 This can be seen as somewhat hypocritical  and the absence of criticism from other 
western states, lets one to some extent, understand where Putin comes from when talking 
about the West appearing to have a detached liberal approach towards International Law. 
Putin often refers to precedents of the West to underline this: “Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and 
Yugoslavia Was this really all handled within the framework of international law?”34 The 
Kremlin frequently uses this divide in approaches as justification for its actions or to outline 
the hypocrisy of the West. In his essay “The disciplines of International Law and Policy”, 
David Kennedy outlines the potential blind spots that make the West  vulnerable  when 
considering disciplines such as international law or international relations,
35
 highlighting the 
need to detach oneself  from a  subjective view and confirming that the understanding and 
practice of international law differs in regions. This thesis seeks to take an objective approach 
when analysing the conduct of Russia in terms of its application of international law. 
Russia in its quest for regaining the status of a super power, definitely constitutes a state to 
investigate as it takes challenging steps in its pursuit. Leading state officials of Russia have 
                                                 
31
 Russian Government. Presidential Executive Office. "Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club." 
News release, October 24, 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860.  
32
 DER WESTEN UND RUSSLAND: Intermezzo. (2014, September 14). Retrieved from https://www.faz.net/-
hox-7tw1n 
33
 United Nations, Office on genocide prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. (n.d.). RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT[Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-
protect.shtml 
34
 Supra note 31. 
35
 Kennedy, D. (1999). The disciplines of international law and policy. Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 12(1), 9-133. 
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repeatedly underlined the importance of International Law to the state. When considering the 
emphasis on respect towards international law of Putin in his Munich speech in 2007 and the 
subsequent war with Georgia or Russia’s foreign policy concept of 2013, in which one finds 
sentences such as “Russia pursues an independent foreign policy guided by its national 
interests and based on unconditional respect for international law.”36 and the military 
intervention in Ukraine, not a year later,
37
 the question arises of how Russia understands 
international law and specifically the law of war. 
2.2 The use of force and Customary Law 
The use of force remains a particularly important aspect to consider for this research, as the 
contemporary state-practice of Russia has proven. Additionally, the use of force greatly 
intertwines with international relations theory as it remains the prime subject for realism. 
The charter of the United Nations governs the restrictions on any kind of foreign intervention. 
The interpretations are divided. On the one hand, one can identify the “restrictionists”, those 
who claim that the use of force is only to be deployed in cases of self-defence, apart from the 
two following exceptions in the charter: Firstly, Article 51 which gives the right of self-
defence in the case of an armed attack against a UN member state.
38
 It has to be mentioned, 
that such action is limited in that it must be proportionate, i.e. to be an action of last resort and 
to not be excessive.
39
 The second exception applies in cases of threats to international peace 
and security under the condition of a mandate of the UN Security Council. Customary law 
supports the argument that those are the exclusive cases of use of force.  
Customary law consists of states that act according to a norm in which those states believe.. 
The term “belief” already hints at the subjectivity of what a state sees or wants to see as a 
norm. Thus ultimately, this belief will be justified by lawyers as opinio juris which is 
essential to create legally binding customary rules. Conclusively, customary law is in a 
position to evolve over time, making the justifications that are being brought about  by states 
in cases of use of force, highly interesting. In theory, the above lets one conclude that states, 
in fact, have the power to create international legal norms through practice and justification, 
although certainly requiring a longer period of time, persuasion and immense undertaking as 
                                                 
36
 Russia, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2013). Concept of the Foreign Policy of 
the Russian Federation. Moscow: Russian government. Retrieved at: 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186 
37
 A. P. (2014, April 17). Putin admits Russian forces were deployed to Crimea. Reuters. Retrieved from 
https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-putin-crimea/putin-admits-russian-forces-were-deployed-to-crimea-
idUSL6N0N921H20140417 
38
 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
39
 Wilmshurst, E. (2005). Principles of International law on the use of force by states in self-defence. Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
15 
the essence of customary law requires general acceptance of the majority of the international 
community. Yet, it is Russia who has been creating precedents in the last 12 years and 
continuously seeks to push norms and further develop doctrines such as the Responsibility to 
Protect. Though, it is much rather the case that International customary law and the inherent 
norms have a restrictive factor in international undertakings of states. As Neil Macfarlane, in 
his book “Intervention in Contemporary World Politics”, points out:  
For intervention to be legitimately mandated, it must be justified in terms of normative 
principles that are generally accepted in international society. Although such 
justification may to some extent be spurious and mask power-political or other self-
centred motivations, the need to justify again narrows the behavioural parameters of 
states.
40
   
In other words, states are limited to actions that will remain within the boundaries of 
legitimate justifications of such actions. Those justifications are mostly heard at the UN 
Security Council, naturally as it constitutes the body to refer to when seeking approval or 
justifications for use of force, intervention or ultimately pushing norms. Thus, in the case 
studies, this research will take those justifications into account and further elaborate if those 
constitute a challenge towards international law and norms in general. 
Russia has repeatedly praised the importance of international law. In all its foreign policy 
concepts international law is mentioned as the underlying foundation of international 
relations.
41
 Yet, Russia’s actions are frequently labelled as grave violations of international 
norms and laws by western politicians. It has to be understood, that Russia has a detached 
approach to international law and its norms. Firstly, Russia has a differing status of values 
from the West. Issues such as state sovereignty as opposed to human rights, are of higher 
importance.
42
 This is also represented in its track record at the European Court of Human 
Rights.
43
 Secondly, Russia sees itself, also in the language of international law, as a distinct 
civilization and in recent practice repeatedly emphasizes this fact.
44
 And thirdly, as Lauri 
Mälksoo outlines: 
Russia imported the discourse of international law from Western Europe only in the 
18th-19th centuries, i.e. several centuries later than international law came to be 
practiced and theorized in the West. International law came to Tsarist Russia to some 
extent as foreign language.
45
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It becomes evident that Russia as a realist actor, places great emphasis on  state sovereignty 
and focuses less on human rights issues. The argument of Russia as a distinct civilization 
becomes increasingly important when considering the repeated argument of securing its 
citizens abroad as justifications for military interventions. The fact that international law only 
came to Russia in a time of complete authoritarianism hints at the nature of the Russian 
perspective on international law.  
With the seemingly apparent contradictions between Russia’s communications and its actual 
actions, one might see Russia using international law as a method to achieve its political gains 
but also as an attempt to influence international law and specifically push emerging doctrines 
such as the Responsibility to Protect, through precedents in a way that would not only justify 
its actions but also serve its future aspirations. With the Kosovo precedent, Russia has found 
itself in a comfortable position to do so, since any kind of condemnation of the West will 
simply be brushed off with reference to the case of Serbia. Despite the creation of customary 
law or the evolution of a norm requiring the acceptance of such by the international 
community, Russia does not cease attempting to create those. This conduct will be 
exceptionally conspicuous in the legal analysis of the case studies. 
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3. THE RUSSIAN APPROACH 
 
The current complex situation on the European continent elucidates the importance of 
understanding Russia’s security aspirations, including its perspective and challenges to 
international law. With its annexation of Crimea and tensions in eastern Ukraine, Russia 
“challenged the European security order at its core”46 and has brought back a type of conflict 
that was deemed to be history on the European continent, consequently bringing about a 
polarization of international relations. Moscow, with its common emphasis on the importance 
of international law and sovereignty, evidently holds a perspective on its recent conduct that 
needs to be analysed.  
Russia’s understanding of international law differs from that of the West. This is only 
exemplified by its actions since 2007. When analysing Russia’s official communication since 
2007, certain common themes are consistently repeated and can be patently identified.
47
 
Russia’s narrative on international law can be broken down into several core paradigms that 
are closely intertwined with its approach towards international relations. Below the most 
important themes that appear throughout all its formal communication ranging from its 
Foreign Policy Concepts to its UN Security Council appearances will be outlined and a 
consequent conclusion reached. 
Russia sees itself as a non-aggressor. Russia positions itself as a country that has the utmost 
respect for international law and all its principles. Putin pointed out, that Russia is “open to 
the world and that it does not have – and cannot have – any aggressive plans.”48 
Affirmations of International law serving as the foundation for correct international relations 
are core messages in its official communication.
49
 Promoting peace under the rule of 
international law is mentioned amongst the top priorities.
50
 
Russia identifies a deterioration of the status of international law by the West. This 
positioning of Russia’s standpoint is continuously visible and particularly so concerning 
matters regarding interventions of western states. To name a few, in 2007, Putin stated “We 
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are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law”.51 In 
2015: “In recent decades the basic principles of international co-operation have been ignored 
ever more frequently” or in comments on Libya in 201652 or on Syria in 2018, describing 
attacks coordinated by western states and led by the US as “unacceptable and lawless”.53 
Russia has continuously condemned interventions by the West and in doing so announces a 
devaluation of the UN Charter. While criticizing the West for its violations of international 
law, another theme can be identified. Russia accuses the west of hypocrisy. Essentially, 
Russia condemns the West for interpreting international law in its favour when it suits and 
when it comes to Russia applying a different set of interpretations to the same kind of 
situation. The West then denounces Russia. As Putin describes it: “If we apply different 
standards to the same kind of events, we will never be able to agree on anything”.54 He 
provides further examples in the western interpretations of the coups in Yemen and in 
Ukraine.
55
  
Russia sees the West as driven by expansionism and geopolitical intentions. This notion 
finds its origins in the NATO expansions that are seen as a deep betrayal by Russia. In the 
final days of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States negotiated an agreement 
for the Warsaw Pact to be dismantled and in exchange it would be guaranteed, that the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization would not expand further and seize the encirclement of the 
USSR. While there are some western politicians such as the then-US foreign minister James 
Baker, that deny that any such promises were made, a recently declassified record of 
conversation shows that the Russians were at least led to believe that an expansion would not 
follow.
56
  Nevertheless, it does represent the official Russian view and widespread public 
opinion within the country on this matter is also very negative.
57
  However, at the time, this 
was seen as a first step in the West and the East coming towards each other. The consequence 
of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe was unforeseen by the Soviet Union. 
Nationalist movements and revolts were coming about in the respective states throughout the 
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Soviet Union and ultimately, the Soviet Union broke up. What followed was the quick 
expansion of NATO into the former Warsaw Pact member states and even further into the 
Baltic States. Given the history of those new NATO members, entering the alliance could 
have only been positive. Yet, from the Russian perspective, it was obviously seen as a deep 
betrayal.
58
 Considering this, one might understand the statement of Vladimir Putin in 2005 
when he referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe”.59 The end of the Soviet Union effectively reversed almost three centuries of 
Russian expansionism within only a few consequent days. Consequently, Russia has been a 
strong opponent of any further eastern expansions of NATO and identified the trend of the 
West to continuously seek to enhance its members in order to encircle Russia. The analysis of 
the case studies, specifically the Russian rationale behind their actions will further solidify 
this premise. 
To conclude, all the above elaborated premises of the Russian communication:  
1. Russia sees itself as a non-aggressor. 2. Russia identifies a deterioration of the status of 
international law by the West and accuses the West of hypocrisy. 3. Russia sees the West as 
driven by expansionism and geopolitical intentions. –have one overarching element to it and 
solidify the hypothesis: “The course of action of the Russian Federation since 2007 is a result 
of perceived aggressions and double-standards”. 
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4. CASE STUDIES 
 
The case studies provide a practical analysis of this research. The actions of the Russian states  
give a great indication of  Russian security policy and its interpretation of international law. 
An additional linkage to Putin’s speech grants the opportunity to link the personal 
predisposition of the leader, International Relations theory and international law in order to 
expound a system that describes contemporary Russian state practice. The case analysis is 
divided into four sections: 
Firstly, a description of the relevant events and those that built up to the conflict will be 
provided. 
Secondly, conflicts will be analysed by taking into account their relevance in terms of 
international relations 
Thirdly, the application of international law will be analysed by taking into account the 
interpretations and justifications that have been brought forward. 
Lastly, an overall conclusion deriving from the previous sections will be drawn and a linkage 
towards the hypothesis will be given per case, respectively. 
 
4.1 Case Study I. Russo-Georgian war 
  
 
 
4.1.1 Events 
On August 7, 2008, Georgia responded to firing coming from South Ossetia by deploying 
military forces in an attempt to establish order. A day later, Russia started a five-day war with 
Georgia, helping the South Ossetians in order to “protect the lives of Russian citizens”. The 
attack came as a surprise to the international community.  
The Soviet Union occupied Georgia in 1921 and henceforth, the country was a constituent 
republic of the Soviet Union. In the following year, the South Ossetian Autonomous District 
was established, within the territory of the Central Province of Georgia.
60
 Additionally, a 
North Ossetian Autonomous District within the Russian borders was created which drew a 
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border between the Ossetians. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the regions South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia declared their independence but were not internationally recognized, 
leaving those regions as a part of Georgian territory, from the perspective of the international 
community.
61
 During the 1990s the Russian government supported a secession movement in 
the South Ossetian district, which aimed to unite with the (in Russian territory-lying), 
Northern Ossetian district. A conflict arose after the Georgians decided to attempt to regain 
control over the region. This caused between 2000 and 4000 casualties. Eventually in 1992 a 
Russian initiated ceasefire agreement was reached, yet all parties increased military presence 
around the region. 
Relations between Georgia and Russia worsened in the upcoming years of the conflict
62
. In 
November 2006, a referendum, having the support of 90 percent of the voters, was held in 
South Ossetia to underline its independence from Georgia. As a consequence of the 
referendum, Russia proceeded to grant citizenship to South Ossetians and to offer them 
Russian passports.
63
 Finally, in April 2008 Russia decided to commence “special 
relationships”64 with South Ossetia which ultimately meant the recognition of the region as 
independent and sovereign. This encouraged the South Ossetian government, which was 
protected by the Russian forces, to commence the deportation of ethnic Georgians from the 
region.
65
 On the first and second of August 2008, the South Ossetian forces bombed ethnic 
Georgian villages within the South Ossetian territory. Reciprocating the attacks, Georgia 
moved its forces into the region in order to secure its citizens and restore order.
66
  
The following day Russian forces with the help of Abkhazian forces, another separatist-
controlled region within the Georgian territory, entered Georgia and attacked its military and 
infrastructure in South Ossetia and beyond
67
 - leaving Georgian forces no option but to 
retreat. What followed was the increased military presence of Russia, the completion of 
deportation of Georgians from the territory and subsequently the recognition of independence 
of the pro-Russian South Ossetia as well as Abkhazia as sovereign states.
68
 On August 26, 
2008, after both chambers of the Russian legislature submitted to Russian President 
Medvedev their recommendations to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent 
states, he signed official decrees on the recognition. 
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4.1.2 Foreign policy goals 
The motivation behind this war is less about the actual independence of South Ossetia but 
rather  more general and symbolic. In order to understand the Russian invasion of Georgia, 
two main reasons can be outlined.  
A certain historical background must be established in order to assess the Russian strategic 
relevance for the war.
69
 Firstly, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 was perceived as 
yet another attempt at the West’s encirclement of Russia after the broken promise of the 
NATO expansions. The United States invested heavily in support of a western-oriented 
president in Ukraine in 2004.
70
 While this was not responded to by the Russians, the talks 
about Georgian orientation towards the West were. In the beginning of 2008, Georgia held a 
referendum assessing the support for NATO membership, an option which was immediately 
condemned by Russia. Dmitri Olegowitsch Rogosin, Russian diplomat to NATO at the time 
even stated: “As soon as Georgia gets some kind of prospect from Washington of NATO 
membership, the next day the process of real secession of these two territories from Georgia 
will begin.”71 From a geographical perspective, a Ukranian and Georgian inclusion in NATO 
would have been tremendous for Russia’s security and would have rendered it extremely 
vulnerable. Furthermore, what served as a major prelude to the Georgian war was the 
overwhelming western support for the independence of Kosovo.
72
 The criticism and warnings 
that followed from Russia when the events unfolded, unambiguously clarify the Kremlin’s 
opinion about it. Putin stated: “unified rules should be applied”73 he further referred to 
Cyprus, another state with similar situations within their borders and asked: “Aren't you 
ashamed, Europeans, for having these double standards?”74 The most important quote, which 
accentuates the importance for the case of Georgia is the following: “Other countries look 
after their interests. We consider it appropriate to look after our interests. We have done some 
homework and we know what we will do”75 At the time this quote was met with speculation 
about what Putin might have been referring to. Retrospectively,, it becomes apparent that the 
Russian president referred to Georgia and its secession-seeking regions - South Ossetia and 
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Abkhazia. Russia’s appeals to leave Kosovo in its state of informal autonomy instead of 
independence were left unheard. From Russia’s perspective, the norm of Europe since World 
War II to not alter national borders was thus through the independence of Kosovo, violated. 
This firstly left Russia assuming the United States’ interest in shifting Russia’s near-abroad 
(Ukraine) to a pro-western orientation and thus to achieve the encirclement of Russia. And 
secondly, Russia acknowledged the lack of reciprocation that met with its appeals about 
Kosovo.
76
 
Thus, by the Russo-Georgian war, Russia achieved a number of things. First of all, the 
geopolitically valuable regions of South Ossetia and Abkahzia were sure to be loyal to 
Russia and allow Russian military presence, so that even if Georgia joined NATO, only part 
of its initial border with Russia would remain Georgian. Dmitry Medvedev commented the 
following to this regard: “Russia cannot feel comfortable in a situation where military bases 
are increasingly being built around it”.77 Secondly, by showing the effectiveness of the 
Russian army, and the readiness to deploy it, Russia proved to the world the credibility of 
its army.
78
 Most importantly though, Russia has proved its influence in its region and has 
made sure to follow its promised change of foreign policy from the 2007 Munich speech. 
Russia has shown that it is able to use military force in its region and that no other actor can 
do so, from a Realist point of view this demonstrates Russia’s power in the region and its 
sphere of influence. 
4.1.3 International law 
This case study will outline the main legal arguments brought forward by the Russian 
Federation for justifying its intervention in Georgia and consequently analyse their standing in 
terms of international law as well as their potential challenge towards norms of international 
law in order to derive a bigger picture of Russia’s perspective on those arguments 
The use of force, as previously outlined, is limited to types of situations. Either, states are 
acting under a Security Council mandate
79
 or in cases of individual or collective self-
defence.
80
 Yet, international law remains an evolving discipline that is subject to progressive 
change. It is, apart from treaties, evolving through actions and how those are responded to by 
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the international community
81
 which elucidates the relevance of the precedent of the Serbia-
bombings. The Russian-Georgian war could be categorized as the first humanitarian 
intervention without a UN Security Council mandate since the above described actions in 
Serbia. With the Russo-Georgian war one can identify a second instance of outer-UN system 
interference under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention, rattling onto the formal 
framework of armed peacekeeping.
82
  
The Russian president at the time, Dmitry Medvedev commented on the event as follows: 
The Georgian leadership, in violation of the UN Charter and their obligations under 
international agreements and contrary to the voice of reason, unleashed an armed 
conflict victimizing innocent civilians. The same fate lay in store for Abkhazia. 
Obviously, they in Tbilisi hoped for a blitz-krieg[…]83 
[…]And it was Russia who at that time put an end to the eradication of the Abkhaz 
and Ossetian peoples. Our country came forward as a mediator and peacekeeper 
insisting on a political settlement.
84
 
It becomes apparent that the Russian president seeks to justify the actions in Georgia by 
assisting the respective regions in their self-defence venture. Moreover, the actions of Georgia 
were described as an act of aggression.
85
 Both, the definition of “act of aggression” and the 
military assistance to self-defence actions have certain requirements to be fulfilled in order to 
be valid under international law. 
 
I. An act of aggression 
The definition of Aggression has been established in 1967 and adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly: 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.
86
 
Evidently, an act of aggression requires one state to use armed forces against another state. 
Furthermore, the UN Security Council is to recognize an act of aggression after the evaluation 
of the circumstances of a military incursion.
87
 This leaves one to conclude that the 
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circumstance of an act of aggression, at least under the realm of international law, does not 
apply in this case, as the Russian president suggested.  
 
II. Military assistance 
The military intervention of foreign troops in an internal armed conflict has certain 
requirements. It must be mentioned, that even though South Ossetia declared its independence 
from Georgia, it was not recognized as such, internationally. Thus, the region remained an 
integrated part of the country rendering any foreign intervention that was not sanctioned for 
by the Georgian government a violation of state sovereignty under article 2.4 of the UN 
Charter: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
88
 
Apart from the already described prohibitions on the use of force, the International Court of 
Justice (hereinafter: ICJ) had already assessed unilateral humanitarian intervention in a case 
involving the United States’ actions in Nicaragua as illegal.89 
While international law allows for the use of force to be legal in certain conditions, such as  
absolute necessity, it does not suffice to have the state with interest, unilaterally assess if the 
necessity requirement was met.
90
 If Russia wanted to use this justification appositely, it would 
have had to establish that the measures taken were in response to damage that Russia suffered 
and were reasonable and proportionate.
91
 It is clear though, that Russian territory was not at 
risk and that the Russian forces did not only attack military installations but furthermore the 
infrastructure of Georgia. 
 
III. Responsibility to Protect 
Russian peacekeeping forces had been in the region since 1992 and relations were worsening 
in the recent years before the conflict, The European Parliament, in its resolution, even 
acknowledged the peacekeepers to be biased and partial.
92
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Arguably the most relevant justification for the war remains the protection of Russian citizens 
abroad. Medvedev described it as follows: 
[…]when it comes to choosing between protecting people's lives and protecting the 
economy, you can understand why we made the choice we did […] protecting the 
lives and the dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they are, is the raison d’être of the 
Russian state.
93
 
The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov justified the need for the use of force the 
following way: 
under the Constitution [the president] is obliged to protect the life and dignity of 
Russian citizens, especially when they find themselves in the armed conflict. And 
today he reiterated that the peace enforcement operation enforcing peace on one of the 
parties which violated its own obligations would continue until we achieve the results. 
According to our Constitution there is also responsibility to protect – the term which is 
very widely used in the UN when people see some trouble in Africa or in any remote 
part of other regions. But this is not Africa to us, this is next door. This is the area, 
where Russian citizens live. So the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws of 
the Russian Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise responsibility 
to protect.
94
 
 
In order to assess this claim, two notions must be elaborated: Firstly, the Responsibility to 
Protect. The justification attempts to claim the internationally accepted conduct to protect a 
state’s citizens using military means if need be. This notion is common and has established 
precedence in international customary law.
95
 The term “genocide” has been chosen at other 
place, possibly to exacerbate the given situation.
96
 The legal argument here can be traced to 
the notion of “Responsibility to Protect”. As a result of the atrocities in the Balkans that have 
been criticized as violations of the prohibition of the use of force by Russia and other actors
97
, 
as well as the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations sought to find a way to react to such 
cases in a way that remains within an international legal framework. Consequently, the 
concept of Responsibility to Protect was developed. The United Nations states: “sovereignty 
is not just protection from outside interference – rather is a matter of states having positive 
responsibilities for their population’s welfare”98 Eventually, the responsibility to protect was 
included in the outcome document of the UN world summit meeting in 2005, reading as 
follows: “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
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genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”99 Continuing and 
emphasizing the involvement of the United Nations as follows: “The international 
community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means”100 It must be noted that the doctrine is 
still under development and remains subject of precedent and customary law for further 
evolution.
101
  
Incidentally, there are some issues with the Foreign Minister Lavrov who brought forward the 
Responsibility to Protect as a justification. Mr. Lavrov, apparently intertwined the duty of a 
state to protect its citizens within its territory and the responsibilities that states have for 
populations outside its borders.
102
 The Responsibility to Protect concerns the protection of 
citizens of a state within its own borders. Other states (the international community) are to 
assist in this and take appropriate action if the state fails to protect its population. Evidently, 
direct action in a foreign country to protect nationals outside a state’s territory does not fall 
under the notion of Responsibility to Protect.
103
 Yet for the sake of argument, even if the 
Responsibility to Protect would have been applicable, Russia would have had to lay 
demonstrate the existence of further requirements,
104
 which are to be established in order to 
conduct the intervention legally. Amongst them are:  
The seriousness of threat – Russia had to establish that the Georgians were committing or 
were about to commit, acts of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against 
humanities. The evidence for that does not point towards a conclusion that Georgia was 
“manifestly failing” to protect its citizens from these acts.105 
Primary purpose – the intervention must follow the primary purpose of protecting the 
civilians. Besides the previously explained political gains, one can deduce the exceeding of 
this requirement by the simple fact that Russia established its control over Abkhazia which 
was not under any threat.
106
 
Last Resort  - While the argument of the intervention being an act of last resort appears to be 
questionable due to the attacks outside the concerned territories, it has to be mentioned that 
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Russia did make an attempt for the Security Council to call for a ceasefire, which could not be 
agreed upon.
107
 
Proportionality – Considering that Russia attacked Georgia beyond the territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the attacks on infrastructure and the deployment of an 
excessive amount of troops
108
, the intervention cannot be considered proportional. 
Furthermore, and as already established, the intervention under the notion of Responsibility to 
Protect, has no legal authority unless it is sanctioned by the Security Council.  
 Secondly, the issuing of passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be elaborated to 
fully comprehend the scope of Russia’s previously mentioned claim. Georgian citizenship law 
does not allow for dual-citizenship. This means the acquisition of a second citizenship, such 
as  Russian, inevitably results in the loss of Georgian citizenship.
109
 In 2002, Russia adopted a 
new Citizenship Law which reformed the former complex system of citizenship application 
and simplified the procedure for citizens of previous Soviet Union states. The new procedures 
did not require certain residency requirements.
110
 Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoyed even 
looser requirements. NGOs with close relations to the Russian government offered a service 
to the citizens and handled the required paperwork, which led to circa 90 percent of South 
Ossetians becoming Russians.
111
 Furthermore, the South Ossetian government passed its own 
law, contradicting the Georgian citizenship law by allowing for the citizens of the region to 
possess dual-citizenship, ultimately allowing for South Ossetian and Russian citizenship. 
Russia, at last by actively providing the separatists with passports, ceased to be an impartial 
presence in the regions.  
 
IV. Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
In late-August 2008, the Russian President signed official decrees on recognizing the two 
regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The recognition was justified in a noteworthy manner. 
The former Soviet Union law, which allows for constituent republics to secede after 
conducting a referendum, was used.
112
 According to the justification, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia remained in the Soviet status, because they did not conduct referendums while they 
were autonomous republics in Georgia. This in return, would render the regions independent 
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from Georgia and make them sovereign states with such status under international law.
113
 As 
the US Library of Congress puts it: 
The Chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation […] reference[d] 
to a former Soviet law, which allowed a constituent republic to leave the Soviet Union 
after conducting a secession referendum.  According to him, the fact that Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia did not have individual referendums while they were autonomous 
republics within Georgia preserves their former Soviet status, separates them from 
independent Georgia, and makes them subjects of international law and sovereign 
states.
114
 
Russia in its documents on recognition and as a legal basis, cites the U.N. General Assembly 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States.
115
 This declaration, includes the principle of self-determination but 
underlines the application of it in the context of ending colonialism. It has to be mentioned, 
that it also includes the obligation to resist the use of force against other states.  
Considering the elaborated aspects, one can conclude that the intervention in Georgia was 
illegal. Russia’s legal justifications do not hold up, but instead create odds with the legal 
documents that are being cited and the actions that Russia undertook: 
1. Georgia did not undertake an act of aggression as the requirements established by the 
UN were not met.  
2. The legal basis for deploying military assistance to South Ossetia was invalid. 
Firstly, it does not have the status of a state. Secondly, unilateral humanitarian 
interventions are not legal. 
3. The Responsibility to Protect does not pass as a valid justification, as all of the 
requirements were not met, not forgetting the lack of Security Council consent. 
Taking into account Russia’s weak stance on human rights combined with its foreign policy 
aspirations the justifications of “securing its citizens” become highly implausible, even more 
so when considering the targeted supply of passports to the citizens, which arguably could be 
seen as the means to deploy that legal argument. 
4.1.4 Case Study Conclusions 
The Russo-Georgian war served as a wake-up call for the West. Russia proved its relevance in 
the world-stage and countered the West’s influence and aspirations. It showed that the United 
States, Georgia’s most important partner, does not have hegemony in the region; instead it is 
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Russia that is able to deploy military force in Georgia, no other state can do so. This 
effectively renders Russia’s sphere of influence to extends to Georgia. Georgian and Ukranian 
wishes to join the NATO were set back and in the process, Russia gained strategically 
valuable military presence in the two respective regions and created a precedent for the 
invasion of Ukraine. The justifications referring to the protection of its citizens, taking into 
account the large-scale distribution of passports to the “stateless” persons in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, is the exact precedent for Russian tactics in Eastern Ukraine. While the Russo-
Georgian war was a huge success in terms of international relations and foreign policy, the 
legal justifications and challenges to international law remained weak. Russia lost itself in 
contradicting legal arguments and could barely remain within the realm of legitimacy. It 
becomes evident, that the legal arguments did not hold any merit. The attempts to reference 
customary law such as the Kosovo-case or to develop norms further remained unsuccessful. 
Firstly, the reference to the Responsibility to Protect was baseless. Secondly, there is no 
acceptance of such by the international community, preventing any further development of the 
principle. The case Russia makes in the legal justifications of the Georgian war, underline the 
importance of the United Nations system. It can be observed, that the unilateral interpretation 
of norms, especially emerging norms, as well as military intervention without legal sanction 
of such, poses high risks and creates insecurity.  
4.2 Case Study II. Ukraine Crisis 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Events 
Ukraine became independent in 1991. Ukraine’s first President, Leonid Kravchuk had a pro-
Western approach to Foreign policy and steered the country away from Russia.
116
 In 1994 
Leionid Kuchma became president and attempted to increase relations with Russia. For a 
decade, Kuchma stayed president and established economic stability in the country. 
Eventually in 2004 Viktor Yanukovych ran against Viktor Yuschenko – former prime 
minister. Yanukovych was announced as the emerging winner, although international election 
observers discovered irregularities in the elections. This led to protests by Yuschenko 
supporters that are known under the name of the Orange Revolution. Yanukovych’ home 
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town was in the predominantly ethnic Russian eastern Ukraine. His voters affirmed to secede 
in case of the results being overturned.
117
 The Ukrainian Supreme Court eventually decided 
the last round of the elections would be repeated and Yuschenko won. His presidency was 
suffering from struggles such as inner-party divisions and parliamentary disputes with 
Yanukovych. Eventually, Yanukovych became president in 2010 and sought to improve the 
relations with Russia by granting Russian leases and most importantly discontinuing the 
progress of the NATO membership.
118
 During his presidency, he has been accused of 
politically motivated prosecutions against dissenting politicians. Finally, in 2013 Ukraine 
became the international centre of attention as it was struck by major protests in its capital, 
Kiev. Protestors demanded the overthrow of the Pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych 
after the discontinuation of agreements with the European Union. Instead, Yanukovych 
moved to further orientate the country towards Russia. Despite the massive unrest, the 
president did not back down. Russia promised economic favours to the administration. 
Eventually, in February 2014 police forces opened fire on the protesters leading to casualties. 
In the meantime, Yanukovych having lost his political support fled the country leading to the 
parliament voting to remove the president from power and setting elections for May.
119
 In late 
February, pro-Russian gunmen seized political buildings in Crimea. On the first of March the 
Russian parliament approved Putin’s request to use force in Ukraine to protect Russian 
interests.
120
 With Russian support, on the 16
th
 of March, Crimea’s secession referendum voted 
to join Russia with the support of 97% of voters. In April, pro-Russia separatist rebels began 
seizing territory in eastern Ukraine and fighting between the military emerged and intensified 
over time.
121
 After the rebels in Eastern Ukraine started losing, Russian forces covertly 
intervened in the region during August, to support the pro-Russian rebels.
122
 Putin, bringing 
forward historical claims of Ukraine being Russia, brought about a low point in relations with 
the West. Russian forces remained in Eastern Ukraine until their significant withdrawal in late 
September.
123
 
4.2.2 Foreign policy goals 
The Russo-Georgian war was six years before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The West 
again sought to expand its member list. The timing underlines the idea that again – Russia 
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sought to contain western influence and increase its own in the process. Russia as a Realist 
state cannot allow for a geopolitically valuable country like Ukraine to become a member of a 
western alliance.
124
 Putin in an interview stated: 
[…] I didn’t care, until then you needed the Ukrainians in NATO. What for? I didn’t touch 
them. They wanted to go to Europe, I said, ‘Great, go to Europe.’ But why did you need them 
in NATO?
125
 
From the Russian perspective, the repeated attempts of Russia’s encirclement are seen as 
hostile acts that can only be replied to by hard power, the following excerpt from Putin’s 
speech concerning Ukraine solidifies this premise: 
After all, [the West] were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine 
and in Crimea. They must have really lacked political instinct and common sense not to 
foresee all the consequences of their actions. Russia found itself in a position it could not 
retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You 
must always remember this.
126
 
Russia once again saw the need to establish its hegemony in the region and to counter the 
influence of the West. Vladimir Putin describes the action as a matter of last expedience and 
just as in the Georgian-case, the Kremlin refers to the precedent of Kosovo in justifying its 
actions attempting to illuminate hypocrisy in western criticism:  
We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special 
case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues?
127
 
Effectively, through the Ukranian crisis, Russia achieved a number of things. Firstly, it 
annexed Crimea and has thus gained an invaluable geopolitical territory, as can be seen by 
the recent Kerch strait incident. The Kerch strait is the waterway between mainland Russia 
and Crimea, which is now under Russian control. In November 2018 Russia intercepted three 
Ukrainian ships in the region and subsequently completely closed the access to the Sea of 
Azov. This leads to secondly: Russia increased its high level of influence in the region, 
which was already high before the annexation of Crimea due to Ukrainian dependency on gas 
exports.
128
 Now, Russia can effectively cut off part of Ukraine’s access to the sea with little 
effort. Thirdly, Russia created a second precedent for countering western ambitions in its 
sphere of influence. 
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4.2.3 International law 
This case study will outline the main legal arguments brought about or forward by the Russian 
Federation for justifying its intervention in Ukraine and consequently analyse their standing in 
terms of international law as well as their potential challenge towards norms of international 
law in order to derive a bigger picture of Russia’s perspective on those. 
 
I. Protecting Russians abroad 
As previously mentioned, Russia is a strong adversary of using the grounds of humanitarian 
reasons as a justification of the unsanctioned use of force. A prime example could be seen by 
Mr. Lavrov in the UN Security Council in 1999 condemning the use of force by NATO 
against the Republic of Yugoslavia. Mr. Lavrov explained: “Attempts to justify the NATO 
strikes with arguments about preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo are 
completely untenable.”129 More recently, in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, under the 
section “Rule of Law in International Relations” one can read:  
It is unacceptable that military interventions and other forms of interference […] 
which undermine the foundations of international law based on the principle of 
sovereign equality of states, be carried out on the pretext of implementing the concept 
of "responsibility to protect"
130
 
If both these clear stances on sovereignty of states in connection with humanitarian 
intervention are considered, it becomes even more questionable to see the justifications that 
have been brought forward after the Russian intervention in Ukraine. In an UN Security 
Council meeting requested by Russia, the state elaborated on its invitation to deploy armed 
forces “until the civic and political situation in Ukraine can be normalized.”131 This was 
sanctioned by the prime minister of Crimea and Mr. Yanukovych the, (as Russia sees it
132
), 
then-legitimate president despite his removal from office. The federation further justified its 
presence by stating the request, which discusses the “threat against the lives of Russian 
citizens […] and members of the military contingent of the armed forces of the Russian 
Federation […]”133. In the following Security Council meeting, an interesting comparison has 
been outlined by Mr. Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the UN:  
[D]oes anyone really think that Russia could allow a repeat of what happened there in 
central and eastern Ukraine, where millions of Russians live? I would recall that, years 
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ago, the United States took over Grenada. President Reagan said that they were 
defending American citizens who resided there. That was 1,000 people, and there was 
no threat to those citizens from Grenada. We have millions living there. They have 
concerns
134
 
Mr. Churkin refers here to the Maidan protests and rhetorically states that Russia would not 
allow for such a situation to arise again for ethnic Russians in Ukraine, effectively acting as 
some sort of protector of them. It can certainly be identified that the rhetoric has a strong 
suggestion (if not only) towards humanitarian justifications. 
 
II. Intervention by invitation 
Yet one can assume that the real legal justification remains the invitation by the supposedly 
legitimate president of Ukraine:  
[…] Mr. Aksyonov, Prime Minister of Crimea, went to the President of Russia with a 
request for assistance to restore peace in Crimea. According to available information, 
the appeal was also supported by Mr. Yanukovych, whose removal from office, we 
believe, was illegal.
135
 
By claiming Mr. Yanukovych’ legitimacy, Russia effectively denies itself any violation of 
sovereignty of state as effectively, by the claims of Russia, it has been legitimately invited and 
thus acted under international law and its norms. The humanitarian elaborations thus merely 
serve as explanatory purposes that seek to build up to why Russia followed the consequent 
invitation in the first place.
136
 Thus one can conclude that the invitation and the humanitarian 
arguments put forward are an intertwined argument which keeps Russia’s stance on Jus 
Contra Bellum legitimate (at least from its own perspective). 
Naturally, in order to arrive at a conclusion of how Russia sees or uses international law it is 
then, essential  to analyse how admissible is Russia’s claim of seeing Yanukovych as the 
legitimate president. Either it served as a Trojan horse covering the actual purpose of seceding 
Crimea from Ukraine to serve geopolitical aspirations or as Russia claims, the lives of ethnic 
Russians were to be protected and were put first and foremost and the stationing of troops was 
sanctioned resulting from a friendly president’s call for help. 
Intervention by invitation is an established legal doctrine and certain requirements are to be 
met in order for the intervention to be deemed legitimate. When considering the 2001 Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, one can outline the 
following:  
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1. Generally, the consent of one state towards another allowing it to commit an act which 
would in case of absence of said consent, be illegal, has to remain within the limits of the 
expressed consent
137
. In this case it becomes interesting to consider again the wording of 
the letter by Yanukovych which the Russian delegation brought forward:  
[…] Russia to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to establish legitimacy, 
peace, law and order and stability in defence of the people of Ukraine.
138
 
 
One can undoubtedly identify that Russia exceeded the limits of that consent, not least  when 
the referendum was eventually conducted by the Russian forces
139
. 
 
2. Consent has to be given by an agent or person, authorized to do so on behalf of the 
state.
140
 Further, who or rather what agent is to allow the consent depends on the matter: 
“Different officials or agencies may have authority in different contexts”.141 This leads 
one to analyse the domestic legal situation in Ukraine in order to find if it was 
Yanukovych’s discretion to express consent in the first place, putting on hold for now,  the 
question of his legitimacy at the time.  
Article 85 of the 1996 constitution of Ukraine veritably provides for such a scenario
142
 and 
clearly sets out who holds the remainder of the power to grant consent for foreign troops to be 
admitted to Ukraine:  
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall have the following powers: […]admitting units 
of armed forces of other states to the territory of Ukraine
143
 
 
Evidently the president of Ukraine, legitimate or not, is not in a position to give consent for 
foreign troops to enter Ukrainian territory, instead it is the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian 
Parliament), which then could potentially grant the president the authority. This did not 
happen. In fact, the parliament removed the president from his seat but did not act in a way 
that would fulfil the conditions of the legal framework that is to be followed in such cases as 
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laid out in article 111 of the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine.
144
 The article describes an ornate 
and lengthy undertaking to impeach the sitting president. Despite the unconstitutional removal 
of the president in February 2014, a wide acceptance of the consequences could be observed, 
leaving Russia as one of the few states that did not accept the outcome. Furthermore, while 
this chaotic removal could be seen as a reason for Russia to refuse to recognize the removal of 
the president, it is evident, that Yanukovych was in exile at the time, again hindering the 
validity of an admissible claim for intervention by invitation since he could consequently not 
be recognized as the legitimate government in exile according to the norms of  international 
law.
145
 
When considering the above, one can conclude that the legal justification under the doctrine 
of intervention by invitation, does not have deep grounding. Firstly, the authority for the 
invitation was assumed by the wrong agent (the president, instead of the parliament) and 
secondly, and arguably most importantly, the limits of the consent were clearly exhausted. 
This, combined with the reports of Putin’s aspirations for the secession of Crimea predating 
the actual letter
146
 by the president, paints a clear picture on the illegality of the deployment of 
forces in the territory of Ukraine. 
Even when considering the Ukrainian president’s dismissal as unconstitutional, this 
circumstance does not merely result in justifying him as the legitimate source of authority for 
an invitation. To exhaust the case for Russia, one should consider that while from the Russian 
perspective, it could be said that an invitation sanctioned by parliament would simply not 
have been possible and thus the only remaining source of legitimacy (the president) was 
assumed. This approach even has backing by some academics, such as Georg Nolte. He 
brings forward the idea that a fairly elected government with general international acceptance, 
can, despite having lost effective control, be seen as preserving the right to invite foreign 
troops.
147
 Evidently the field is still developing and thus presents a prime opportunity for 
Russia to challenge the norms in this very field. Yet one can still identify the ill-intent which 
is evident through the exceeding of the invitational limits, as well as the aspirations for 
Crimea. Thus, the assumption of Russia using the invitation as a “Trojan horse” can be seen 
as proven. 
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III. Self-Determination/Referendum 
Russia’s argument was repeatedly based on the right of the Crimean people to have a right to 
self-determination. In the Security Council Mr. Churkin declared:  
[T]he reunification of Russia and Crimea,[…] through a free referendum, the people 
of Crimea have fulfilled what is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and a 
great number of fundamental international legal documents – their right to self-
determination.
148
 
Yet, as pointed out by Christian Marxsen:  “international law does not provide a legal basis 
for a right to secession outside the colonial context.”149 While there is a debate to exceptions 
about this, these remain under the condition that the internal self-determination was not 
possible due to human rights violations,
150
 which would invalidate a claim of the right in the 
case of Crimea. It must be mentioned however, that while international law does not grant the 
right to secession, it also does not forbid secession itself.
151
 It only does so, when the 
secession is a result of outside intervention. Interestingly, this is established through the 
International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion about the declaration of independence of 
Kosovo.
152
   
Russia seeks to alter the notion of remedial secession. This could already be observed in the 
Russo-Georgian war by the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Mr. Churkin clarified 
the stance on the matter of secession under international law in a Security Council meeting 
concerning Crimea:  
In each particular case, one must seek the right balance between the principles of 
territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. It is clear that the achievement 
of the right to self-determination in the form of separation from an existing State is an 
extraordinary measure. However, in the case of Crimea, it obviously arose as a result 
of the legal vacuum created by the violent coup against the legitimate Government 
carried out by nationalist radicals in Kyiv, as well as by their direct threats to impose 
their order throughout the territory of Ukraine.
153
 
This can be seen as a drastic change of interpretation. In 2008, Russia explained its stance on 
remedial secession in the proceedings of the International Court of Justice.
154
 Russia 
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elaborated the requirements to have to be “[…][E]xtreme circumstances, such as an outright 
armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question”.155 
The above description clearly does not require an armed attack. It merely requires the threat 
of such.
156
 
Evidently, the intervention of Russia in Ukraine was illegal under international law. The 
Russian legal claims are contradictory and without merit. A similitude to the Russo-Georgian 
war can be diagnosed: 
1. Russia, against its own principles, uses the argument of protecting Russians abroad. 
This argument, as also established in the previous case study does not hold legal merit. 
2. The intervention by invitation argument was not accurate mainly for two reasons: 
Firstly, the limit of the consent that was given to the Russian troops to be deployed in 
Ukraine was exceeded. Secondly, the consent was given by a person without the authority 
to do so. 
3. The Russian interpretation of the right to self-determination not only contradicted itself 
to a previously established stance on the matter but furthermore substantially deviated 
from the international consensus. Furthermore, it has been established that the right to 
secession does not have a legal basis  
The hypocrisy of the statements highlights the political motivation behind Russia’s actions as 
opposed to a legal or humanitarian one. 
4.2.4 Case Study Conclusions 
Russia found itself in a position to reassert what it broadcasted in 2008 – Russia’s sphere of 
influence extends to its near abroad and attempts by western expansion to respective regions 
are dealt with in a realist manner. The build-up of events such as the immense pro-Western 
public opinion and the consequent economic promises by Russia to the pro-Russian President 
reinforces this notion. In addition to the balance of power, Russia gained a strategically 
important territory. In the case of Crimea, the approach towards international law became 
increasingly evident: Russia uses international law as a means of achieving its political 
aspirations. While the intervention in Georgia already suggested, that the legal justifications 
are used as a cloak for the state’s actions, the Ukraine case manifests this proposition. Russia 
by not accepting the removal of Yanukovych, again took an opposing stance on a matter that 
was subject to otherwise-consensus by the international community. 
 
                                                 
155
 Ibid. 
156
 Ibid. 
39 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper set out to answer the research question: Russia approaches international relations 
and the closely connected international law, specifically jus ad bellum and the principle of 
self-determination since 2007. In order to do so a critical analysis of the official Russian 
position as well Russia’s actions has been carried out. 
The established hypothesis: The course of action of the Russian Federation since 2007 is a 
result of perceived aggressions and double-standards of the west can be seen as practically 
proven due the following findings of the case studies: 
Russia, by its repeated references to the broken promises of NATO expansions, already 
provides the source of its course of action. What followed was the expansion of the European 
Union towards the east bringing about western-orientated opinions that Russia sees as 
predecessor of NATO membership. While a weakened-Russia could not counter the first 
expansions, it could so in 2008 and reacted after the affirmations of the alliance towards 
Georgia, by invading Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2004 the West supported the Orange 
Revolution and with the United States’ involvement in supporting western-orientated affairs 
leading up to the pro-Russian president escaping the country, yet another limit was reached. 
The geopolitically important Crimea was taken and mainland Ukraine destabilized. 
It is evident, that the change of Russia’s foreign policy and the aggressions in Georgia and 
Ukraine were attempts to re-establish influence in parts of its former Soviet sphere. It has to 
be observed though, that Russia does not, except for Crimea, annex the territories it seeks to 
control. On the one hand, an annexation would make a harder case for legal justification but 
furthermore, such a move would have given western-leaning politicians an effortless playing-
field.  Annexation would cripple Russia’s aspirations. Russia’s desired status for the 
“problem-countries” – those that are western leaning, is that of a frozen conflict as those 
countries are unlikely  to join NATO. 
Classical realist, Hans J. Morgenthau argued that the importance of international norms for 
states is only important to the beneficiaries of those and those who would benefit from a 
change will seek to bring about that change.
157
 Russia’s approach to international law 
resembles this approach. It becomes evident, that Russia uses international law and its norms 
as an apparatus to achieve or justify its international undertakings that are based on its 
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political aspirations. This approach is most evident in two incessantly appearing approaches. 
Firstly, Russia routinely contradicts itself. This ranges from the condemnation of the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo only to then continue to use it as a precedent for Russian intervention 
itself; – over the countless reverences for international law and the importance of the UN 
Security Council in Russia’s foreign policy concepts and speeches, despite its repeated 
unilateral actions and violations of international norms; -to warnings about “creative 
applications of international law on the pretext of implementing the concept of responsibility 
to protect”158, which is precisely what Russia did - twice.  
Secondly, Russia continuously points the finger at the West. The broken promise of the 
NATO-expansions is still prevailing rhetoric for Russia’s state officials and apart from the 
legal claim, the political argument of the Kosovo precedent has served Russian state officials 
on numerous occasions. 
It can be concluded, that the hypothesis of this thesis is proven theoretically, as outlined in the 
chapter “Russia’s approach”, as well as practically by the practical analysis through the case 
studies. 
Russia appears to have no regard for the value of international norms. Its expressed respect 
for the UN system and the Security Council can be revealed by its veto power, allowing it 
increased influence on matters of highest importance. Russia acts merely from the perspective 
of its state interest. This phenomenon has been described as a characteristic of realist actors. 
In fact, as Shirley V. Scott points out about realism:  
The process of international politics is accounted for by the concept of power and 
international law is regarded as having no intrinsic significance
159
 
This is further underlined by the experience of Russia’s repeated amendments of state-
positions on matters such as the requirements for the Responsibility to Protect – depending on 
which interpretation is currently aligned with the policy-aspirations of the case. If one seeks to 
understand the Russian foreign policy, the prime focus should lie on the issues of state 
interest. Russia is not a state that would act through morality, despite its many references to 
humanitarian justifications. One conclusion can be presumed with certainty: Any western 
attempt to influence Russia’s near abroad will cause a reaction purely based on Russia’s 
realist nature as opposed to norms of international law. 
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